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Philosophical LogicsA Survey and a Bibliography
Georg Struth
November  
Abstract
Intensional logics attract the attention of researchers from diering aca
demic backgrounds and various scientic interests My aim is to sketch the
philosophical background of alethic epistemic doxastic and deontic logics
their formal and metaphysical presumptions and their various problems
and paradoxes without attempting formal rigor A bibliography concise
on philosophical writings is meant to allow the readers access to the maze
of literature in the eld
 
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 Introduction
Only a few decades ago the concept modality was known only to philosophers
linguists and logicians with philosophical inclinations Today the situation
is completely changed Cognitive science and especially articial intelligence
are now the sciences which have predominant interest in modalities at least
when formal theories of modalities are concerned Since Hilary Putnam pro
posed his functionalism thesis many philosophers among them Jerry Fodor
Fred Dretske and Noam Chomsky believe that the computer is the adequate
paradigm for the study of complex entities like knowledge belief thought and
language learning One therefore might expect an intense interaction between
dierent academic domains in favor of synergetic eects but a closer examina
tion of the AI literature reveals that this is only partially the case
 
 I believe
that this lack of cooperativity is mainly due to a dierence in mentalitya
dierence of scope on the concept of a scientic problem Scientists usually
have a pragmatic attitude towards scientic problems Those problems are be
lieved to be obvious and metainvestigations about their status are avoided For
many philosophers on the other hand only to say what a genuine philosophi
cal problem is lies at the core of philosophy Scientists often have the feeling
that philosophical investigations only hamper the scientic enterprise or even
that they are merely confusions So they often even try to immunize their work
against philosophical considerations Obvious exceptions of this case are sci
entic revolutionsas Thomas Kuhn would call itor changes of paradigms
when scientic theories become infected with doubt and metareasoning seems
unavoidable
I think that the tendency of immunization against philosophical considera
tions is not entirely misplaced in general but in our particular case it inhibits
eective work of a certain group of researchers In order to characterize this
group further let me rst introduce some rough distinctions Depending on
education and academic background there seem to be at least two dierent
general motivations to study modal theories
The formal tradition studies the algebraic model and prooftheoretic fea
tures of modal theories for instance metalogical properties as completeness
decidability the characterization of nontrivial models Interdependencies be
tween various calculi or between algebraic and model theoretic properties the
interplay between syntactic and semantic characteristics and the relation be
tween modal logic and higherorderlogic are investigated This tradition is con
nected with Tarski Segerberg Fine Gabbay Cresswell van Benthem Fitting
and others A subtradition of the formal one is what I call the implementa
tion tradition connected with the names Farinas del Cerro Wallen Ohlbach
Gabbay Fitting and others
The metaphysical tradition is interested in modal metaphysics or intension
ality in general This tradition stems from analytic philosophy and philosophy
 
The fact that there is almost no transfer of ideas from philosophy to the sciences seems
to be one of the most severe problems of philosophy in general and philosophy of science in
particular Almost no working physicist for instance is aware of the foundational attempts
for Quantum Mechanics done by philosophers of science since more than half a century

of language and is connected with names like Carnap Kripke von Wright Hin
tikka Church Montague Kaplan Castaneda and others A subtradition is the
cognitive science tradition attempting to model modal concepts like belief
obligation permission and knowledge for cognitive science or AI purposes
connected with the names Halpern Fagin Konolige Levesque Lehmann de
Rijke and others
This perhaps provoking distinction is intended mainly to point out two
things First computer scientists are split into two groups subsumed under
mathematical and philosophical positions This is not meant to be a rigorous
distinction but only to depict a tendency Second not all researchers investi
gating modal logics are naturally confronted with philosophical issues But I
argue that the cognitive science tradition is To make my point let me examine
the relation between metaphysics and cognitive science more closely
According to functionalism computer models lead to adequate represen
tations of human intelligence or thinking in general and modal concepts in
particular Adequacy may in principle be achieved in three stages namely on a
physical or physiological a cognitive or conceptual and an empirical with respect
to a limited environment basis
Physical adequacy is beyond the scope of cognitive science It is claimed
that an investigation of the hardware of thought is not necessary to understand
thought and intelligence Thought and intelligence are rather seen as abstract
concepts independent of a physical realization Empirical adequacy on the other
hand is too limited it is merely an engineering approach heuristically trying to
build limited systems which behave like intelligent agents This approach may
be methodologically appropriate to make progress in science but researchers
on an AI mission should always be aware of its limitations It is a tautology
that cognitive scientists require cognitive adequacy but by giving upper and
lower bounds I tried to depict its meaning without dening it
Functionalism now is the bridge between cognitive science and metaphysics
Cognitive adequate models of modal concepts are believed to have metaphysi
cal impact depicting what modal concepts are by how they work But beyond
functionalism as a philosophical theory I think that it is almost common sense
among AI researchers to be scientists and not engineers to study thought and
intelligence as abstract entities and not merely to imitate or approximate the
structure of the brain with dierent means So in a way I believe that func
tionalism is nothing but an attempt to precise mainstream AI ideology
Cognitive science therefore is confronted with philosophy not only for foun
dational but also for methodological reasonsas for instance Quantum Me
chanics deals with philosophical questions like causality and holism But there
is one big dierence to Quantum Mechanics where philosophical questions arise
as a consequence of the interpretation of the formal apparatus In the case of
modal logics it is the philosophical decisions that determine the formal sys
tems But the philosophical decisions in this context are rather transparent
and do not imply such obscure concepts like causality scientic explanation
or realism as it is usually the case in philosophy of science Here they arise
in a twofold way First there are metadecisions for instance about how to
construct a formal modal system its syntax and if relevant its semantics Sec

ond there are meaning decisions for example of how to formalize the modal
concepts with regard to natural language discourse and metaphysical conve
nience The name meaning decision pays tribute to the Carnapian view that
expressions formalizing some concept can be seen as meaning postulates The
last point may not seem very philosophical to some readers maybe they are
right but nevertheless philosophers investigate these problems since almost a
century and I think that it would be convenient to share their experience
Now there remain two main problems The rst is to show to what ex
tent metaphysical questions have impact on formalizations the second one to
overcome the language barrier between philosophy and computer science I
use Freges semantic theory to face both problems to give an introduction
to the philosophical theories of intensionality and to show how philosophy of
language and metaphysics are intertwined After this metaphysical prelude I
discuss propositional alethic modal logicthe mother of almost all modern
modal logics with a view at meta and meaning decisions Then in further
sections the specic philosophical problems of epistemic and deontic proposi
tional logics are considered In a last section various philosophical approaches
towards a quanticational intensional logic are discussed
Readers of AI literature might have the impression that there are canon
ical modal logics for knowledge and beliefnamely S and Sand that the
transition from propositional to quanticational logics is straight forward but
from a philosophical point of view this impression is not adequate I argue
that philosophy of language provides a powerful general apparatus to handle
modalities that goes beyond the precision of many of the AI approaches On
the other hand concrete AI systems may be seen as a testbed for philosoph
ical theories as for example rigid and nonrigid designators or the transworld
identity problem which perhaps in the spirit of Kripke might turn out to be
no problem at all
So this survey has the fourfold aim to give a brief formal introduction to
alethic epistemic and deontic logics to discuss the philosophical problems con
nected with intensionality in general and with the formalization of modal con
cepts in particular and to provide a bibliography with emphasis on philosoph
ical literature If the reader becomes aware of the many nontrivial problems
imported by a philosophical perspective or at least is guided to nd exciting
philosophical literature I consider my mission accomplished
 A Metaphysical Prelude
  Historical Remarks and Basic Concepts
In the introduction I used some philosophical concepts that may not be part
of a computer scientists vocabulary These concepts shall be introduced in this
section together with a brief exposition of the history of modal metaphysics
Philosophical theories of modalities are more than thousand years older than
the explicit use of the word Aristotle in his prior analytics not only distin
guishes four ways of specifying a statement as possible contingent impossible

or necessary

 he was probably also the rst to developmodal syllogisms Unless
Aristotle who used modalities only in this de dicto way specifying expressions
other Greek philosophers employed also de re modalities specifying physical
objects

 Consider for example the sentences
i Godel proved that rst order predicate calculus is complete
ii Godel proved that rst order predicate calculus is necessarily complete
iii Necessarily Godel proved that rst order predicate calculus is complete
Sentence ii is obviously true It ascribes a de remodality because the necessity
of the predicate calculuss being complete is a matter of fact But sentence iii
ascribing a de dicto modality by claiming that sentence i is necessarily true
is wrong because Godel might possibly have shifted his interests from logics to
psychosomatics before trying the proof or the proof might have been anticipated
by somebody else
The linguistic transition from the adjective modalis to the noun modus
was achieved by scholastic philosophers around Aquinus who also obtained an
elaboration of modal theory According to the new theorymodimay be physical
or logical specifying an object or an expression by a concept for example as
an essential or an accidental property of a substance or specifying it through
a syllogism Aquinus for instance conceived of three dierent entities a mode
can specify namely a subject Philosophical ideas are important for modeling
cognitive concepts a predicate Many researchers from the AI community
almost completely ignore the philosophical background of modal logics and
the relation between a subject and a predicate I believe that the AI community
should take philosophical ideas seriously
Note that only the last expression is modal in the modern sense The modal
metaphysics of Aquinus and Duns Scotus are excellent examples for the highly
elaboratedbut today almost forgottentechnical apparatus of scholastic logi
cians This is not the right place to go into details but philosophy of language
is really not an invention of the twentieth century

 Another concept the
propositional attitudes of contemporary philosophy of language expressing the
state of mind that a person has related to an expression can be found in Oc
cam and possible worlds which made Leibniz famous were not only discussed
in Descartes some years earlier their invention can probably be ascribed al
ready to Gilbert de Poitiers and later Duns Scotus

 Nevertheless possible
worlds had a bad reputation in philosophy for the next centuries perhaps due
to their rejection by Hume until philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Carnap
prepared their renaissance in analytic philosophy early in this century

In fact the etymology of the English concepts can be traced back to Boetiuss translation
of corresponding Greek ones Boetius also introduced the attribute modalis in connection
with these specications

The explicit terminology for the de rede dicto dichotomy was reintroduced centuries later
by Thomas Aquinus

For an introduction to medieval logics consider for instance 		


cf the discussion in 
 especially in footnote  of this text

Despite the rejection of possible worlds modal concepts still played an im
portant role in metaphysics they lie for instance at the heart of Kants Kritik
der reinen Vernunft     The functions of thinking in a judgment can ac
cording to Kant be subsumed under four concepts Quantity quality relation
and modality Krv A	


 Modality is dened as that function of a judgment
which does not contribute to the judgments content but expressesas in Aqui
nuss third clausethe relation of the subject and the predicate of a sentence
Kantin contrast to Aristotelian traditiondistinguishes three kinds of judg
ments with respect to modality possible problematische Urteile true or real
assertorische Urteile and necessary apodiktische Urteile ones KrV A	
Another inuential idea of Kant is that modalities do not contribute internal
information about the object a statement is about but express the epistemic
relation between the speakers ratio and his empirical application and the
statement KrV A today one would again speak of propositional attitudes
Denitions of modalities are meant to be explanations of the empirical use of
the concepts possibility necessity or reality KrV A  the postulate of
possibility of things requires for example that its concept coincides with the
formal conditions of an experience KrV A

Today following von Wright 
 one would give a whole catalogue of
dierent modalities
  Truth or Falseness the majority of philosophers would opt for omission
  alethic modalities necessity contingency and possibility
  epistemic modalities knowledge beliefsometimes considered a proper
a doxastic modality
  temporal modalities always sometimes etc
  boulomaic modalities desire wishes etc
  deontic modalities duty permission obligation commitment juristic
norms etc
  evaluative modalities good bad ethical norms
  physical or causal modalities causal consequences etc
  modalities of action somebody does did will do starts doing stops
doing something etc
  mellontic modalities modalities of process of becoming
These modalities can be further structured by dening alethic epistemic boulo
maic causal and temporal modalities as ontic modalitiesmodalities of being
by subsuming evaluative modalities under the class of deontic modalities and

Traditionally Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft is not referred to by pagenumbers but
by a special index The meaning of KrV is obvious the letters A or B stand for editorial
variants and the number gives the location in the text
	
modalities of action under the class of mellontic modalities So much for the
history of the concept of modality let us now return to Occams and Kants
idea of propositional attitudes Those are today treated in the context of in
tensionality a concept that I already have used without a denition Theories
of intensionality will be the content of the next section
   Frege Semantics and General Intensionality
For readers familiar with formal semantics the semantical theory of Frege is
not hard to understand modulo a translation of Freges terminology to the
modern standard one Consider a formal language together with a domain of
interpretation There are now two relevant levels a symbolic and a physical
one Symbols denote objects or the latter are the denotation or extension of
the former But according to Frege this is not enough for a formal semantics
as a theory of meaning
In his inuential article 

Uber Sinn und Bedeutung 	
 Frege asks why
the equations a  a and a  b dier in cognitive content Erkenntniswert
He argues that this dierence can neither be a matter of symbols as notation
is arbitrary nor of extension because in case a  b is true then a and b
must denote the same object the extension of the symbol is the same and
then the dierence disappears Frege in order to incorporate the cognitive
content therefore calls for an intermediate third level where the arbitrariness
of symbols vanishes but their dierence is conserved In a more formal way in
extensional semantics there is a valuation function mapping symbols to objects
of the domain Now if a is equal to b the valuation function maps both symbols
to the same object Analogically assume a function that maps the symbols
to the new level such that the values of this new function may be dierent
although the symbols may denote the same object But how could we give an
intuition to this third level Frege tries in dierent ways and it was sometimes
argued that he mixes up what should best remain separated     I leave it
to the reader to follow Freges arguments 	   in detail and sketch a modern
paraphrase of his account
The entities that are supposed to be situated at the new level and which I
roughly brought in connection with cognitive content are usually called inten
sions senses or meanings Before considering these concepts more closely let us
take a closer look at the ontological side of the problem ie at the bearers of in
tensions etc Here again the situation parallels formal semantics Frege doesnt
analyze sentences in terms of subject and predicate as philosophical tradition
had done since Aristotle he employs applications or saturations Sattigung of
a functional parta concept Begriand an object Gegenstand  	

These ideas lead to the following scheme

symbol proper name concept symbol sentence
intension intension
intension
of proper name of concept symbol
proposition
extension object concept truth value
impression impression impression
impression connected with connected with connected with
proper name concept symbol sentence
Names and their role in language are an important subject in analytic philoso
phy Frege and Russell gave ideas on how to treat them As we just saw names
according to Frege have intensions as well as extensions Russell employs a
much smaller ontology than Frege For him only sentences have intensions
the other entities referring directly But what both theories have in common is
that names can be eliminated in favor of denite descriptions for example the
name Armstrong by the denite description the man who rst walked on the
moon In fact all names can be eliminated and the information is then carried
by a predicate identity and bound variables But in general one must be care
ful The expression The Holy Roman Empire for instance is a name but not
a denite description because it was neither holy nor Roman nor an empire
Today it seems that many philosophers among them Kripke and Kaplan favor
the direct reference approach I will return to this subject in connection with
objectual quantication and rigid designators
There is perhaps one oddity in the table above Sentences are nothing but
names for truth values This on the one hand is exactly the situation of propo
sitional logic on the other hand it shows how little information is carried by
extension such that another level of language seems indeed necessary to make
communication possible Let me close this argument with a little deviation
to Freges general ontology Frege is a Platonist postulating three realms of
existence a realm of physical objects Dinge der Auenwelt a realm of subjec
tive impressions Vorstellungen and a realm of nonphysical objects existing
independent of human thought eg intensions like propositions Gedanken
relations or properties truth values etc
The objects of the rst realm are physical in the sense that they can be
measured with a physical device or are directly accessible to human sense
organs The objects of the second realm are the purely subjective colorings
and illuminations Farbungen und Beleuchtungen that every cognitive agent
connects with the objects of thought The objects of the third realm are non

physical in the aforementioned sense but they are assumed to exist without any
relation to a human being Mathematical theorems for instance are assumed
to exist independently of humans proving them The third realm is also popu
lated by intensions even by intensions of extensionless sentences extensionless
propernames like Pegasus and of extensionless concepts like moves faster
than the speed of light In Freges ontology even all higher order concepts and
their intensions explicitly exist for instance not only the existence of functions
but also of functions of functions etc ie of higher order functions  is as
sumed Those readers familiar with calculus will note a striking similarity of
ideas and it is no wonder that Alonzo Church who developed this calculus later
became the great modern champion of Freges semantical theories as David
Kaplan    calls him
From the argument presented above it follows that Freges intension shall
be independent of any cognizers and psychological inuences which explains
the separate last line in the table abovethe private aspects coming with any
cognition are accidental and do not contribute Now Frege gives two denition
of intension First he denes the intensions of proper name symbols concept
symbols and sentences I should better say declarative sentences of course as
the way they are given 	  or speciedso he denes them with reference to
modalities in the medieval meaning of the wordbut he still gives a dierent
one for sentences namely as that whichif anythingmay come into question
for truth  Here the twofold meaning that the term intension has in Freges
philosophy becomes evident Note that the asymmetry between the two def
initions is only supercial Name and concept symbols have only an indirect
connection with truth They have no truth values but determine the truth
value of any sentence in which they occur In more modern terms intensions
in the Fregean sense can be ascribed the following features  they are ob
jects of thought they have cognitive signicance allowing for an individuation
of propositional attitudes and thoughts they bear the meaning of declarative
sentences and they determine the truthvalues
It is the last feature that rst proved accessible to formalizations Carnap
referring to ideas of Wittgenstein took the statement to come into question
for truth literally and dened a proposition as the set of those possible state
descriptions in which the corresponding sentence is interpreted as true The
idea behind this is that in order to understand the meaning of a sentence one
must be able to predict its behavior in changing situations to know under what
circumstances it will turn out true false or without denotation Today most
philosophers formalize propositions as characteristic functions of sets of possible
worlds 	       that is as functions which assign to each possible
world one of the two truth values    but this is clearly in the same spirit


Another modication is that today the standard terminology has shifted from
state description to possible world Maybe this terminology is a bit mistaken
because the idea behind possible worlds is really not that of some mysterious
universes in hyperspace but coincides with the commonplace supposition that

Readers familiar with  calculus might perhaps nd some pleasure in verifying the analogy
that intensions are in principle  abstractions over possible worlds
 

things could be dierent Unfortunately the concept of possible worlds if
taken literally in the original Leibnizian sense opens the door to metaphysical
speculation and a touch of science ction Actually there is no conceptual
dierence to the sample space of probabilistic calculus and many philosophical
pseudoproblems would disappear if one had chosen a more neutral terminology
right from the beginning

 For more elaborate theories of intensionality in
this spirit consider for instance the writings of Kaplan    Gallin 	 and
Anderson 
All approaches to a general logic of intensions characterized so far share
one important feature Intensions are reducible to possible worlds and truth
values It is doubtful whether this is still a reconstruction of Freges ideas and
therefore only natural that logicians like Church   
   Bealer   and
Anderson  proposed taking intensions as irreducible entities thus dispensing
with possible worlds For a detailed discussion see  Church explicitly claims
that his systems are reformulations of Fregean semantics
The above alternatives are still heatedly debated Anderson gives a series
of arguments in favor of the latter approach arguing that a possible worlds
approach is appropriate only for alethic modalities
	
 On the opposite Ka
plan    believes that for his intensional logic of demonstratives a possible
world approach is more convenient There are even authors who see possible
worlds as an historic error and a possible worlds metaphysics simply as coun
terintuitive    but I do not want to go into that fundamental discussion
Let us now turn to a second Fregean perspective in intensionality 	  the
perspective of indirect speech indirekte Redein modern standard terminol
ogy intensional or referentially opaque contextsclosely related to the problem
of formalizing propositional attitudes To give an example consider the sen
tence
Laurence Sterne was illreputed for his frivolity
This context tolerates salva veritate substitution of Laurence Sterne by any
expression with the same extension for example by The author of Tristram
Shandy Contexts in which such substitutions of equiextensional expressions
salva veritate are possible are called extensional contexts Now on the other
hand the sentence
It is necessary that the author of Tristram Shandy is the author
of Tristram Shandy
is true but its substitutional variant
It is necessary that Laurence Sterne is the author of Tristram
Shandy

We will remember this fact in the context of transworldidentity
	
These arguments depend on the intensionalhyperintensional dichotomy developed in the
sequel and are similar to arguments against formalizing epistemic logics analogously to alethic
modal logics
  
is false Which is the class of substitutional invariants for this kind of sentence
It is often stated that the distinction between necessary and contingent state
ments rests on the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths the latter
being true by virtue of facts the former dividing into the class of truths of
logic and into the class of those nonlogical truths which can be decided alone
with the help of a dictionary As often in philosophy there is much controversy
about the analytic synthetic dichotomy and there are even philosophers like
Quine who are sceptical of this dichotomy in general But there is one impor
tant point for us The class of logical truths or in general the class of analytic
truths is exactly the class of sentences which is invariant salva veritate under
substitution in contexts like the above which are called intensional contexts
This can be taken as a denition of an intensional context Note that this
denition coincides with Carnaps denition of intensionslogical truths have
the same truth value in all possible circumstances
Beside intensional and extensional contexts there is a third kind of context
which is sometimes called hyperintensional where not even substitutions of
equiintensional expressions are tolerated Examples for hyperintensional con
texts are propositional attitudes like statements about beliefs knowledge and
convictions For example a beginner with logic may believe the logical truth
of the formula
  
without believing the logical truth of the equivalent statement
    
which is one expression of the paradox of material implication
In Fregean semantics reason for the nonextensionality of some sentences
is easily explained The denotation of an intensional sentence is a proposition
ie an intension and that of a hyperintensional sentence even is a relation
between an agent and a proposition A deeper analysis of these semantical
features would lead right to theories of thatclauses or indexicals of Kaplan or
Castaneda but we stop here and draw the following conclusions
  Alethic and deontic contexts are intensional
  epistemic contexts are hyperintensional
These facts play a crucial role for the construction of epistemic logics
 Propositional Modal Logics
 General Remarks
In the sequel I want to keep the general remarks about intensionality in mind
and specialize to the less ambitious alethic deontic and epistemic modal cal
culi in order to discuss their applicability to AI purposes Following Bull
and Segerberg 
 Kreiser et al  
 Chellas  Lenzen   Meyer et
al     and
!
Aqvist  
 we introduce the propositional variants before
 
proceeding to quanticational theories Deontic and epistemic modal logics
grew up in the shadows of alethic modal logics
 

 so I treat the alethic logics
rst too For the following paragraphs I assume the readers familiarity with
nonmodal rst order logic and the basics of modal logics their syntax and
semantics Therefore I do not attempt rigor in formal details but concentrate
on an informal discussion of motivations and philosophical background of the
formal concepts
According to van Benthem   three pillars of wisdom support the edice
of modal logiccompleteness theory correspondence theory and duality theory
Completeness theory studies the interplay between syntax and semantics of
modal systems correspondence theory the interdependence between axioms
and frame constraints on accessibility and duality theory the relation between
model theoretic and algebraic properties of modal logic This is the typical
point of view of a mathematician philosophers would add at least two further
pillarsthe pillar of application and the pillar of metareection Applications
in this context do not include implementation issues because these problems
seem technical rather than structural they are rather to be understood in
connection with questions like internal adequacy for modeling modal concepts
or propositional attitudes what I called meaning decisions in the introduction
In opposition to that metareections consider external adequacy for example
by investigating what general features a theory formalizing intensional concepts
should possess
In this spirit it is only natural to start with two metareections First
should modalities be incorporated as metalinguistical	 predicates or else as
sentenceforming operators Second what kind of approach towards modal
logic does one preferthe syntactic the model theoretic or the algebraic ap
proach
The rst decision is that between an approach which leads to a hierarchy
of metalanguages and another one which remains at one level A metalinguis
tic predicate acts on metatheoretical names of sentences as in Tarskis theory
of truth andas for example in some early systems of deontic logic for in
stance 
 or Godels provability interpretationiterations of modalities are
not necessary or even meaningless Another signicant feature of the predicate
approach is that applications of modal predicates are not restricted to names
of sentences one is free to insert names of entities like proofs or acttypes 

 

Bull and Segerberg in the historical part of their paper  do not only give references to
the historically interested reader they also mention the standard textbooks on alethic logics
some of the more recent survey papers collection of important papers and bibliographies
Besides this work I suggest reading Hughes and Cresswell 	 	 Chellas  and the
survey paper by Fitting 
 For a discussion of the older epistemic systems and historical
items I recommend Lenzen 		 bibliographies may be found in Lenzen 		 	 Good
surveys for the more recent development and especially the applications to computer science
are the papers of Halpern and Moses   and Meyer et al 	
 	
 As introductions
to deontic logics consider

Aqvist 	 and van Eck 
 At the beginning of his references

Aqvist gives indications of bibliographies the one in 
 approaching 	 items reference
to standard publications or selection of important articles as 
  can be found in

Aqvist
and van Eck A reader interested in the history of deontic logics should take a look at von
Wrights survey 		
 
The sentenceforming operator approach may be called the standard approach
I will concentrate on the latter in this text
The second decision between a syntactic a modeltheoretic and an algebraic
approach is more controversial There are several subtraditions which can be
subsumed under the syntactic approach
The intuitive semantics approach Lewis Becker von Wright Mally Grze
gorczyk tries to formalize realworld semantical intuitions of modal concepts
through syntactic rules and axioms like Euclidean geometry yielded a syntac
tic axiomatization of the properties of classical space Especially in the case of
epistemic and deontic logics this approach became infected with paradoxes
how can one guarantee that the theory is sound with respect to intuitions One
major problem seems to be that material implication does not really conform
to our natural language intuitions But however intuitive semantical consider
ations must precede any inquiry in modal logics if they are meant to be more
than formal games
The relevance and entailment approach cf Anderson and Belnap  con
stitutes an alternative to classical logic trying to cope with certain paradoxes
eg the paradox of material implication and inconveniences of classical logics
The proof theoretical approach Zeman   Prawitz   Bull and Seger
berg 
 Boolos Wallen 
 Fitting  Ohlbach   may be subdivided
into two branches One branch being the provability interpretation of modal
logics the other one concentrating on proof methods like sequent calculi natural
deduction or resolution
The modeltheoretic approach is discussed at large in the introductory sec
tion of Bull and Segerberg 
 including a brief discussion and some refer
ences concerning the birth of possible world semantics so I dont want to go
into details An inuential predecessor of this tradition was Carnap   with
his theory of state descriptions inuenced by Wittgensteins concept of logical
space The contemporary model theoretic tradition can be subsumed under
the slogan relational semantics beginning with the work of Kanger  
   

Hintikka  and Kripke      Recent years witnessed the emergence of
some nonstandard possible world semantics  Within the standard theory
many rened methods for an overview consider 
   have been developed
correspondence theorystudying the relation between the formal properties of
the accessibility relation and the axioms of the theorywas developed    
and denability features in connection with higherorder logic    were
investigated
The outstanding gure of the algebraic tradition is Alfred Tarski In his
joint paper with J"onsson  
 Stones representation theorem  	  relating
boolean algebras and algebras of sets is generalized to boolean algebras with
functions implying that the algebraic theory for propositional logic could be
lifted to propositional modal logics Bull and Segerberg 
 discuss how nat
ural features of the modal algebras reect those of the corresponding modal
logics and rst of all their model theoretic properties One may draw the con
clusion that Tarski and his collaborators anticipated the early model theoretic
results it is indeed not di#cult to use ideas from the proof of Stones theorem
to obtain the crucial model theoretic structuresframes and modelsfrom the
 
algebraic ones without postulating possible worlds one rather considers the set
of ultralters constructed on the power set of the carrier of the algebra These
algebraic results apply even to such modal logics where no standard Kripke
models exist denitions follow The algebra then induces general models which
correspond in a way to the models of higher order logics   For more informa
tion on these algebraic features which I will not consider further in this text
I recommend any standard work on algebraic logic or the writings of Bull and
Segerberg 
 van Benthem   Goldblatt  and Fine cf the bibliography
of 
 Because of these fundamental results many logicians favor an alge
braic approach as fundamental The fact that the algebraic resultsof course
without the explicit transfer to Kripkeframeswere published six years before
the rst model theoretic results without being recognized by the philosophic
community must be considered a historic peculiarity
Resuming these ideas possible worlds today do not have the predominant
status that they had in the sixties and it is questionable whether they really are
the most natural approach to modalities I have already pointed out that there
are general intensional logics without possible worlds and now we have seen
that also modal logics can do without it So possible worlds in the literal sense
of the word are only possible approaches to our purposes but not necessary
ones
  Alethic Modal Logics
This section introduces to some of the most fundamental concepts of alethic
modal logic with intended applications to epistemic and deontic systems start
ing with the basic syntactic notions The language L
M
of modal logic is a
language L of nonmodal predicate logic supplied with the additional symbol
  L
M
 L  f g Finite strings of L
M
symbols are called expressions the
set of L
M
formulas is the smallest set of expressions containing all Lformulas
closed under the formation rule   L
M
    L
M

A propositional modal logic is any nonmodal propositional logic for exam
ple the smallest subset of L
M
containing all tautologies and closed under modus
ponens and the substitution rule One could use any nonmodal propositional
calculus
  
over L
M
in order to obtain this logic Then all syntactic notions like
derivation or proof can be transfered from nonmodal propositional logic
As modal logics are intended to be theories of specic modal concepts and
therefore conceived to be richer than nonmodal logics not only in vocabulary
we must extend the calculus by new axioms and rules thus providing mean
ing postulates for the modal concepts to be explicated Following Bull and
Segerberg we call a modal logic classical if it contains the axioms
K       
t  
  
Here and later we follow Fitting 
 by using the notion of a logic for a set of sentences
closed under certain conditions a calculus is a specic set of axioms and rules leading to a
logic
 
but a logic with only these additional axioms is still too weak for most appli
cations A further step is to provide the calculus with new rules
nec

 

mon
 
   

cgr
	 
 	  
 
A modal logic including K is called congruential when closed under the con
gruence rule cgr regular when closed under the monotonicity rule mon and
normal when closed under the necessitation rule nec Normality implies Reg
ularity implies Congruence
Normal logics because of their semantic and syntactic niceties are the
most familiar systems of modal logic For reasons that will become clear later
consider now the relation between nec and mon One dierence is that the
formula   can be derived in normal but not in regular logics Another fact
is that addition of   to a regular logic allows for a deduction of nec So the
axiom   is the crucial dierence between a normal and the corresponding
regular logic
Even at this stage the logics constructed so far are too weak for applications
Let us follow Bull and Segerberg in giving a catalogue of modal systems using
the Lemmon code which concatenates named formulas But rst for the sake
of brevity let me dene the operator dual to  
	   
The following list contains some of the most popular formulas leading to axiom
systems with realworld applications
D   
T   
     
E   
B   
Tr  	 
V  
M    
G    
            
      
            
          
H 
 
 
 

Grz       
W       
The name D stands for deontic T is a name invented by Feys  signies
the characteristic axiom of Lewis S system E stands for Euclidean B for
 
Brouwer Tr for trivial V for verumM for MacKinsey G for GeachH
for Hintikka Grz for Grzegorczyk Dum for Dummett and W for anti
wellordered The name K dened some lines above honors Kripke We now
list the names of the systems to the left and the corresponding Lemmon code
to the right The systems given below are dened to be the smallest normal
systems containing the formulas on the right side of the equation as axioms
K  K
T  KT
S  KT
S  KTB  KTE
deontic T  KD
deontic S  KD
deontic S  KDE
Brouwer system  KTB
S    KTM
S   KTG
S   KT  
S   KT 
S     KT   
S    KT  
Priors Diodorean logic  KTDum  D
Grzegorczyks system  KTGrz  KGrz
Lobs system  KW KW
the trivial system  KTr  KTMB
the verum system  KV
The Geach formula      can easily be expanded to the generalized
Geach formula
G
mnpq
 
m
 
n
  
p

q
 
Then many of the formulas given above can be seen as special cases
D  G

 
 
 T  G

 



  G

 

 E  G
 
  

B  G


  
 Tr  G

 



G


 


G  G
    
 
The normal logics form a lattice Pictures are given in    

Besides these Hilbert calculi there are also natural deduction sequent tab
leaux and resolution systems For natural deduction the classical reference is
Prawitz   consider also Fitch   and Siemens Jr   For tableaux
consider Fitting  for a matrix calculus Wallen 
 and Ohlbach   for
resolution General introductions are of course Bull and Segerberg 
 and
Fitting  where also some of the problems connected with these methods are
discussed
 
 In general for the most popular systems there are nonaxiomatic
calculi but there are other systems for which only axiomatic calculi exist
 
For natural deduction for instance there is a symmetry break between the elimination
and the introduction rules
 	
Without going further into the details let us now turn to the semantics of
propositional modal logics I want to concentrate on model theoretic semantics
the references for the other kinds of semantics are given above
A Kripke frame is a pair F  hW Ri of a nonempty setWthe set of pos
sible worlds and a binary relation Rthe accessibility relationonW  Strictly
spoken frames are just directed graphs A Kripke model M  hW R vi is
a triple of a frame together with a valuation function v which assigns a truth
value to every propositional letter in every world So v w   is the formal
expression of the fact that the sentence  holds in the possible world w Note
the dierence to classical logics where models are true interpretations Here
a model is merely an assignment of meaning But of course the concept of
a possible worlds model is used to dene truth or semantical implication we
have to distinguish between truth in a possible world in all possible worlds and
in all models of a certain class The notion of truth in a possible world is
paralleling the construction of modal formulassimply the nonmodal truth
denition relativized to possible worlds plus an additional rule for the modal
operator With the denitions given above
M w


j    fa w
 
 WRw


w
 
Mw
 
j  
By duality the rule for the second modal operator is
M w


j   exw
 
 WRw


w
 
andMw
 
j  
In words Under the alethic interpretation
 a formula is necessarily true in a
possible world if it is true in all possible worlds accessible from the rst one
and possibly true in a possible world if it is true in at least one possible world
accessible from the rst world Furthermore a formula is called valid in a model
M if it is true in all possible worlds of this model Note that thereby all
logical truths are necessary truths as desired Let C be a nonempty collec
tion of models Then a formula is called Cvalid if it is valid for all models
in this collection it is Fvalid in a collection of frames F if it is valid in the
collection of all models based on this frame Note that frames are already suf
cient to structure validity because the quantication over valuation functions
is merely a combinatorics of truth values The concept of C or Fvalidity plays
exactly the role that unrestricted validity plays in nonmodal logic the restric
tion being due to the fact that one is not free in the choice of the accessibility
relation Given these denitions it is straightforward to dene the concept of
semantic consequence and related properties But the deduction theorem for
example a standard theorem of rst order logic obtains only for a restricted
class of frames namely that closed under generated subframes and ultraprod
ucts  
 This comes down to the question of rstorder denability  
For the above set of frames completeness proofs are also straightforward The
most popular systemsamong themD T B S and Shave the abovemen
tioned properties and thus all the nice properties of nonmodal propositional
logics as completeness compactness LowenheimSkolem and decidability as
can be veried by considering any standard text For completeness results and
decidability proofs see for example Chellas  He gives them for the normal
 
systems in Lemmon code K K KE KE KB KB KD KD KDE
KDE KDB KT KT KTB and KTB
The frameconstraints on the accessibility relations for the several axioms
are also not di#cult to obtain They can be calculated from algebraic se
mantics 
 guessed from the possible worlds semantics  
     or
calculated by an algorithm based on resolution   I will only give the re
sult generalized Geach formula sloppily using objectlanguage quantiers for
metalanguage expressions
G
mnpq
w


 w
 
 w

w

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 
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
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
This frameconstraint obviously describes a diamond property remembering
the ChurchRosserProperty of calculus or the conuence property of rewrite
systems It enables easy deduction of the constraints for the most popular for
mulas
T reexivity D seriality or idealization
B symmetry E euclidity
 transitivity Grz inductivity
W nite irreexive trees K no restrictions
G diamond property or directedness
Again from rst order denability there are formulasas for example the
McKinsey formulafor which no rst order frame constraint exists   But
instead of going further into details let us rather discuss the specic meaning
postulates introduced by the various axioms thus simulating the procedure of
informal semantics We consider this as the natural way of obtaining modal
logics As van Benthem writes  limits for the useful application of a corre
spondence perspective are to be found in philosophical relevance
 rather than
technical impossibility  
  The necessitation rule states that every proof from propositional logic of a
formula can be extended to a proof of its necessity Therefore all tautolo
gies are necessary nec is really built into the possible worlds semantics
it is even a motivation for the latter as from a metaphysical point of
view at least the analytical sentences of logic should be necessary and
if one wants to formalize these logical necessities only the necessitation
rule gives a full account of this fact
  The distribution axiomK expresses the closure of modalities under conse
quences for instance necessary truths entail only necessary truths This
isin a waythe strengthening of nonmodal material implication to
modal contexts what seems quite natural because necessity is nothing
but quantication over possible worlds The example to conclude the
sentence It is necessary that electrons are fermions from the premises It
is necessary that if electrons have noninteger spin then they are fermions
and It is necessary that electrons have noninteger spin seems to be in
perfect coincidence with our intuitions
 
  In alethic contexts T is reasonable too If something is necessary then
it must be true in a deliberate world
   says that something is necessarily necessary if it is necessary This also
seems plausible because for example a necessary fact holds not only
possibly necessarily Butcontrary to the examples given so far one is
not forced to accept this formula One may accept it as formalizing ones
intuitions or choose another axiom as well
  B seems plausible too because something true is trueby a law of
metalogicin at least one possible world But as this is a metalogical
denition one may express it as a logical analytical sentence of the object
language as well
Similar arguments are easily given for most of the other formulasincluding
D E G and the axioms leading to the logics between S and S
A look at the frame constraints reveals further information about the cor
responding modal concept Reexivity for example requires only very limited
exchange of information from one world to another on the other hand this
allows for much freedom for the individual worlds ie for situationalism where
the modal concept may change wildly from one world to another Symmetry
allows for a return from any vertex in the graph The modal behavior in one
world now inuences that in its neighbors without determining it Information
is only available from neighbors Transitivity establishes unidirectional infor
mation ow on paths Two of these constraints still allow for situationalism it
is only all three constraints together that give a partition of the set of possible
worlds into equivalence classes This situation where one has independent clus
ters of equivalent possible worlds ismodulo equivalencethe situation that
Leibniz had in mind the situation of truth in all possible worlds This nally
motivates the accessibility relation It allows for a weakening of the metaphys
ical concepts and for situationalism what might be useful in connection with
nonlogical analytic expressionsthere might be a world where electrons have
noninteger spin and are bosons per denitionem
Up to now Ilike most of the textbookshave mentioned only positive
results now here are some negative ones
  There are axioms without rst order characterizable frame constraints
  the McKinsey axiom violates the LowenheimSkolem property
  irreexivity is not modally denable
  the relation between correspondence and completeness is only partially
understood  
  the relation between modal and higher order logic contains many open
questions
  not all modal logics are complete 	 not even all rst order axiom
sets  


This may su#ce to show why modal propositional logic is not at all trivial
On the other hand it may give one of the reasons why some modal systems are
more popular than others
There is even one more item which makes the popular systems more popular
some modal logics have all the nice properties For the weak modal systems
there exist countably many distinct modal prexes for nonmodal formulas
because the axioms only allow for accumulation and not for reduction of modal
operators In the stronger systems those reduction rules are available and
therefore only nitely many distinct modal prexes exist For a broad discussion
of these facts consider any of the standard textbooks  
   
 here are
only some results 
  T deontic T the Brouwer system the deontic Brouwer system and de
ontic S possess a countably innite number of distinct modal prexes
  S possesses exactly fourteen distinct modal prexes namely the empty
prex             and their negations The reduction
laws are
 	    	 
 	      	    
  S possesses exactly six distinct modal prexes namely the empty prex
   and their negations The reduction laws are
 	     	  
	  	   
For some applications normal logics seem to strong One way of weakening
is to consider regular or even congruent logics But the shift from nec to mon
has some impact on semantics The Kripke models considered so far are too
strong for regular systemsin regular systems the formula   is Kripkevalid
but no longer derivable To weaken the semantics one assumes queer worlds in
which logical truths come out false But then from mon in particular from
 
   

it follows that   must be false for deliberate  in any queer world too So
nothing is necessary in queer worlds but by duality everything possible These
ideas given the construction of frames is obvious    

An augmented frame is a triple hW QRi where hW Ri is a frame and
Q  W is the possibly empty set of queer worlds The set N  W  Q is
called the set of normal worlds The models based on augmented frames are
constructed as usual except the denition of the necessity operator
M w


j    w


 N and fa w
 
 WRw


w
 
Mw
 
j 
the rule for the dual operator is obvious
 
For regular systems all the metatheorems of normal logics still hold but
correspondence theory is more complicated because now frame constraints can
relate normal worlds normal worlds with queer worlds or even queer worlds such
that one has to x the constraints in an appropriate way for example by using
the formula   as a selector between normal and queer worlds The restriction
of transitivity to normal worlds for instance leads to the characteristic formula
         instead of       The modication of the formulas
is obvious but expressions may become a bit lengthy during calculation
Augmented models are extensions of the models for normal calculijust
set N   to obtain the latter On the other hand if a logic has theorems
that are necessary the set of queer worlds must be empty So again and as
required   acts as a mediator between regular and normal logics but now
on the semantic side Instead of assuming a formula globally as in the case
above one can assume it locally Let F be a collection of frames fGg and fLg
sets of sentences and  a formula Then we write fGg j
F
fLg   i for every
model M based on every frame F  F where fGg is valid and every possible
world w from F  in which fLg is trueM w j  fGg is called the set of global
assumptions fLg the set of local assumptions The dierence is that global
assumptions are per denitionem necessary while local assumptions may hold
locally in some worlds but not in others A local introduction of   amounts
to the introduction of this formula to normal worlds For instance the logic
where   is locally assumed in the regular counterpart of T is called S the
assumption to the regular counterpart of S is called S These systems are
not closed under regularity but under the somewhat stronger Becker Rule
  
    
These systems might be appropriate candidates for epistemic logics  but I
am not sure whether there is a deeper analysis of these ideas in the literature
We return to this question in the context of logical omniscience and rational
belief
Another type of frame are the socalled general frames 
    These
frames have an algebraic and an intensional perspective The algebraic per
spective can be taken from Bull and Segerberg 
 and van Benthem   or
from the more detailed articles of Goldblatt  and the numerous publications
of Fine cf the bibliography of 
 As already mentioned frames arise in
the context of duality theory in a natural way
The idea behind duality theory is to study translations between model the
oretic and algebraic modal structures The embedding of a frame in a modal
algebra is easy Roughly one takes the power set of the set of possible worlds
to build a set algebra with some special provisions on accessibility to construct
the modal operators of the algebra The general frames are needed for the other
direction From ideas connected with Stones theorem it seems appropriate to
use the set of all ultralters on the carrier of the algebra as the set of possi
ble worlds of the corresponding frame But now there are possibly much more
ultralters than elements in the carrier of the algebra such that the set of pos
sible worlds contains more falsiers than the carrier of the algebra In order to

balance the two systems one has to modify the concept of frame by restricting
the frame F to the general frame G  hW RPi where P  fp  W  a  pg
and a is some element from the carrier of the algebra ThenP is the part of
the frame corresponding to the carrier of the algebra Note however as a de
tail that starting with a general frame transforming it to a modal algebra and
then back to a general frame results in frame still not isomorphic to the orig
inal one Further restrictions or renements on the general frames have to be
imposed 
There are also subtle correspondences between higher order logic and general
frames but want nish with these supercial remarks on algebraic models and
turn to the intensional perspective
As stated above propositions can be seen as functions from possible worlds
to truth values These functions can be constructed in models but not in
frames where valuations are not yet specied To built intensions into frames
on may use the structural properties of propositions given by closure conditions
on the domain of possible worlds These closure conditions can be shifted on
the sets of possible worlds which determine the proposition So again one can
dene a general frame somewhere in the middle between frames and models with
P closed under complement union and a specic modal projections   
Fitting  draws the general conclusion
If one is merely interested in characterizing logics
 general frames
are of no more use than frames The advantage lies in their meta
mathematical featurestheir algebraic properties are more natural
But the additional machinery of general frames is natural and may
turn out to be useful for applications It is good to be aware of it
With the idea of propositions in the background one can dene an even more
general type of semantics which is not relational anymore but encompasses the
other ones Why not declare for every possible world the set of propositions
necessary in it This leads to the so called neighborhood semantics orMontague
Scott semantics A neighborhood frame is a pair hW Ni where W is a set of
possible worlds and N is a mapping from possible worlds to the power set of
the set of possible worldsto the domain of propositions The name stems
from the fact that in Graph Theory all vertices connected to a vertex are
called its neighbors such that the mapping N indeed is a mapping to the
neighborhood of a vertex The semantics of the necessity operator are then
straight forward  
   the relevant rule is of course as usual the necessity
operator
M w


j  	 fw
 
 W M w
 
j g  N w



Neighborhood frames are the characteristic frames for congruent logics As
in the case of normal and regular logics frame constraints can be calculated
when supplementing the minimal congruent logic with the usual axioms  

Congruency is an important property It is the presupposition for replacement
of tautological equivalents in a formula
Finally here is again a negative result together with some general remarks
There are decidable normal calculi without a possible worlds semantics  



  So from a mathematical point of view relational semantics seem not
entirely satisfactory But from a philosophical point of view one still may
doubt how far these pathological calculi constructed only to demonstrate the
insu#ciency of possible worlds semantics are important with regards to a for
malization of metaphysical modal concepts For at least the alethic concepts
a possible worlds semantics seems su#cient and satisfactory But as already
mentioned there are alternatives also from the philosophical side
 Epistemic Modal Logics
In our century the investigation of epistemic logics began with the work of
$Lo"s   on assertions and Pap   on belief The incorporation of relational
semantics is due to Hintikka 	 and was extended by von Kutschera  
Lenzen gives a detailed analysis of the most important systems for knowledge
and belief until the end of the seventies    and proposes a series of new
systems   My impression is that philosophical endeavor for epistemic logics
was rather limited such that the number of publications in the eighties and
nineties in philosophical journals is rather small and there seems to be not
much development since Lenzen On the other hand the AI community became
more and more involved starting with the work of Halpern and Moses 
Levesque   Moore  

 and Kraus and Lehmann    Good surveys from
this perspective are Halpern and Moses  and Meyer et al    
Approaches to epistemic logics usually oscillate between two extreme posi
tions The rst pays tribute to the fact that epistemic expressions are de facto
hyperintensional  
 and therefore require a modeling deviant from alethic log
ics because hyperintensionality destroys the closure under modal consequences
and substitution in modal contexts is forbidden as well Further the concept of
belief needs an appropriate embedding into a probabilistic context The second
one conceives epistemic logic as nothing but a reinterpretation of alethic logic
Most existing systems try to combine the nice formal features of the normal
alethic calculi with the philosophic and linguistic requirements of hyperinten
sionality As far as I know there actually exists no satisfying hyperintensional
approach most logiciansfor the sake of formal simplicitytend to intension
alize the epistemic predicates or attitudes according to one of the following
ways
First with the assumption of ideal epistemic predicates as in Godels proof
system which uses an idealized provability predicate The transfer to epistemic
predicates is far from obvious  
 second with the assumption of omniscient
epistemic subjects ie the introduction of rational epistemic agents   whose
propositional attitude is closed under consequences Hintikka 	 Lenzen  
and third with the assumption of epistemic predicates or attitudes not referring
to sentences or propositions explicit epistemic predicates but to equivalence
classes of equiintensional sentences or propositions Church   or to the class
of sentences or propositions logically implied by the
sentence addressed by the epistemic attitude von Kutschera   implicit
epistemic predicates
The second way is the most popular one immediately leading to a formal

ization that parallels alethic logics I want to concentrate on this approach
starting with the naive assumption of equivalence of alethic and epistemic op
erators But the problem of hyperintensionality lurks right at the beginning
Normality immediately induces the problem of logical omniscience
First from    and   one can deduce   by K and modus ponens
So if   is interpreted as a knowledge or belief operator then someone who
knows or believes  and   must believe  too In the case of the doxastic
interpretation Lenzen for instance replaces K by a weaker rule which I want
to call K
K
 namely            The reader may translate
this formula to natural language and decide whether this seems reasonable
Second nec forces know or believe all tautologies
I think it is worth while discussing the consequences of the assumption of
normality which has consequences obviously deviating from common sense and
the use of epistemic concepts in natural language Maybe rational belief or
logical omniscience have applications in AI contexts but it should always be
explicitly veried that this application is sound Lenzen   defends the ne
cessitation rule for epistemic systems they cannot describe what some fool
believes because then they would merely model mental states and have no
deductive power at all He gives no explicit reasons for his preference of nor
mality over the weaker systems but I suppose him to believe that nec gives
the clearest concept of rationality In fact this is far from obvious It seems
reasonable that a rational believer believes some short tautologies but one may
have a machine that writes down a tautology which is so long that our ratio
nal believer cannot even read it in his lifetimeis it still rational to believe it
But on the other hand where should be the cuto for rational beliefs should
one approximate believers by requiring that he or she must know or believe
all consequences that one can derive within n steps for some small n and all
tautologies of a certain form and a certain length And what is a rational belief
at all Lenzen argues that the fact that rationality in this context must han
dle only logical truths and not the larger class of analytic truths leaves space
for prejudice and erroneous behavior it only makes beliefs coherent Without
going into details concerning the concepts of belief and rationality I only want
to point out that there are problems for doxastic logic right from the beginning
and there is really no idea how to avoid it At least it is not clear why Lenzen
does not try rules weaker than necessitation this might be a way into the right
direction
But before looking for alternatives to the rational believer let us consider
further axioms of alethic logic after some general remarks about the nature of
knowledge and belief Knowledge and belief both are propositional attitudes
relating a cognizing subject to a proposition So compared to alethic logics
epistemic logics require further dimensions or degrees of freedom namely a
bearer of knowledge or belief and maybe also time coordinates because per
sons learn new things and forget them and they revise their beliefs So the
complete informal account of an epistemic expression would be something like
x believes that  in the time interval between t


and t
 
 The bearer of beliefs or
knowledge is the most important coordinate the crucial case is when operators
are iterated It clearly makes a dierence whether I know that I know that I

deserve a better position or whether my boss knows that So it is convenient to
index the operators but the relevant cases with operator iterations are those
where all operators carry the same index and such none
Another question that should be discussed before any formalization is about
the structural properties of beliefs and knowledge For belief there is not much
general to say in principle it is a subjective attitude I have already mentioned
the problems of logical omniscience further insights will be gained along with
the discussion of the axioms For knowledge the case is dierent because knowl
edge has some objective features The minimal requirement is that knowledge
implies truthone cannot know things that are falseand this of course leads
immediately to axiom T It is standard terminology to distinguish two dierent
kinds of knowledge namely the weak concept of knowledgeknowledge as true
beliefand the strong concept of knowledgeknowledge as justied true belief
The stronger concept can be found in Platos Menon or the Theatet  
Lenzen gives separate formalizations of the strong and the weak concept But
let us now discuss the axioms
  T is not convenient under the doxastic interpretation because the fact
that some people believe in God does not imply his existence Under the
knowledge interpretation as already mentioned it is acceptable
  D can take over Ts role in doxastic contexts because the belief of one
proposition implies that one does not believe the negated propositionif
I believe in God then I do not believe that God does not exist D is
weaker than T it can be deduced with the help of T and the fact that
nonmodal implication is transitive
   under the knowledge interpretation means that if I know something I
know that I know it This principle is called positive introspection and is
fairly reasonable for knowledge But if I believe something is it reasonable
to say that then I believe that I believe it Lenzen   gives arguments
in favor of this
  E is equivalent to       Under the knowledge interpretation
this adds the principle of negative introspection if I do not know some
thing I know that I do not know itthe same with belief It is open to
discussion if one is willing to accept the principles of positive and nega
tive introspection Lenzen argues that it is too strong for both knowledge
and belief but in many AI publications it is considered adequate
   is equivalent to the formula  
      sounding reasonable
for weak knowledge I know something if it is true and it is not the case
that I know that I do not know it Lenzen argues that S is exactly
the right system for weak knowledge thereby deviating from Hintikka
who takes S for weak knowledge
  G is relevant for strong knowledge according to Lenzen Therefore the
logic of strong knowledge is S But this demission is highly controver
sial in the literature

  Lenzen further discusses the characteristic formulas of S  S and
S with respect to their applicability He concludes that it is merely
a matter of taste to make a decision but in general it is very di#cult to
judge the more or less complex axioms between S and Sas already
stated Lenzen himself prefers S as the logic of strong knowledge
 

To summarize the above considerations note that there are many concur
ring models for belief and knowledge and it is far from clear which one is
correct But perhaps one should take a pragmatic pluralistic position and rel
ativize the concept of correctness to applicability to certain contexts Lenzen
which as far as I know gives the most elaborate discussion of epistemic logic so
far decides for S for strong and S for weak knowledge His calculi for
belief are not normal because they use the doxastic version K
K
instead of K
Lenzen altogether gives eight dierent calculi not only for knowledge and be
lief but also for conviction and combined epistemic modalities In multiagent
applications in AI it is standard to consider concepts like common knowledge
These concepts do not present any philosophical complications and are no fur
ther investigated by Lenzen Possible worlds semantics for epistemic logics are
analogous to the alethic case in the doxastic case it is appropriate to use a
kind of neighborhood semantics with a probability measures instead of acces
sibility functions We do not want to go into details and refer the reader to
Lenzen  
But now to weakenings of normal systems Fitting  in opposition to
Lenzen believes thatK is too strong even for knowledge As we already pointed
out the crucial dierence between normal and regular systems is the formula
 in regular systems one is not forced to know or believe all consequences
of tautologies but one can show that if anything is known then so is every
tautology So also regular logics are not at all satisfactory Fitting pleads for
S or S as being close to reasonable logics of knowledge
Finally I want to mention the approaches of Levesque   and Fagin and
Halpern  for doxastic logics Both approaches employ standard syntax
deontic S a normal logic but change the semantics
Levesque following the terminology of Church and Carnap distinguishes
between implicit and explicit belief submitting only implicit belief to logical
omniscience Explicit belief is treated with a situation semantics %a la Barwise
and Perry   This approach is not appreciated by all researchers because it
has strong resemblances with relevance logics   On the other hand there
arewith the success of linear logicmany people who believe that relevance
logic is even more convenient to natural language deduction than material im
plication which is designed rst of all for reasoning within mathematics
Fagin and Halpern supply the frames with an awareness function from pos
sible worlds to sets of formulas of which the agent is aware Now in their
approach explicit belief is implicit belief plus awareness
In general there is promising current research on these items in AI but my
 
Meyer et al 	
 in opposition to Lenzen prefer S as the appropriate system They
seem to be aware of the philosophical controversy about S but their main argument in favor
of S are its nicer technical properties
	
overall impression is that there is almost no coordination with philosophical
investigations The problem of logical omniscience remains and it is even un
clear whether it is a problem at all Beliefs are rst of all private propositional
attitudes without commitment to truth or laws of nature or logic But this
concept of belief has nothing to do with deduction On the other hand if one
looks for a principle of rationality it is not at all clear that it must be as strong
as the one that Lenzen supposes In fact rationality is a vague and somewhat
obscure philosophical concept and standards for rationality convenient to AI
contexts seem di#cult to deriveif one wants to go further than dening a cut
o in the way described above On the other hand it is questionable whether
at the current state of the art it is not better to employ heuristics to proceed
 Deontic Modal Logics
Deontic logic is the most problematic and the least developed of the modal log
ics Though deontic problems were already discussed by the ancient Greeks it
was only in our century that formal theories were developed Historically inter
ested readers should consider Kalinowski  
	 Rescher  	 or Knuuttila   
For an introduction to the elder systems consider F&llesdal and Hilpinen 
and for an exposition of formal systems
!
Aqvist  
 The rst prominent modal
theory of our century is due to Ernst Mally    Von Wright 
 
 de
veloped a highly inuential system OS the so called Old System But before
going into details let us again make some general remarks
Deontic logic is the logic of obligation prescription prohibition forbid
dance permission and commitment conditional obligation The correspond
ing natural language terms are
obligation shall ought must
prohibition shall not ought not must not
permission may is allowed to
commitment if  is the case then it shall must ought to be that 
Now the question is what kind of sentences are built with the help of these
termsare they prescriptive sentences leading to legal ethical or social norms
ordescriptive sentences where the deontic predicates express a relation between
a norm addressee a proposition and a norm source or an authority
Only descriptive sentences have a truth value and therefore there cannot be
a semanticsat least not in the usual model theoretic sensefor prescriptive
modal logics So it is not at all clear if a deontic logic should have a possible
worlds semantics
 

 
According to

Aqvist 	 this goes back to Bentham and Hedenius In Hedenius termi
nology prescriptive sentences are called genuine and descriptive ones spurious Wedberg calls
the former ones internal and the latter ones external Stenius uses the distinction between
modal and factual sentences Hansson  between imperative and descriptive ones and von
Wright  norms and normpropositions in the same spirit

Aqvist recommends studying
previous attempts for logics of commanding  	 	 	 to nd systems where addressees
and authorities are made explicit

But what are norms Almost tautologically norms are sentences with nor
mative impact on human or social behavior There are at least three dier
ent approaches to norms namely the linguistic approach according to which
norms are certain linguistic entities the naturalistic approach according to
which norms are behavioral regularities and the platonist approach according
to which norms are ideal duties
Weinberger 
 gives four properties of norms Norms are no descriptions
of reality they cannot be veried they cannot be reformulated as declarative
sentences and there is no deductive relation between norms and declarative
sentences But nevertheless it is common sense that one can deduce new norms
old ones This deduction of course must not be meant in the logical sense
It is also obvious that systems of normative sentences or normative codices
have properties like redundancy and consistency which should be open to log
ical investigation In von Wrights rst system for instance deontic logic was
conceived as a logic of norms there was no mechanism to iterate deontic predi
cates which on his account are not applied to normsentences but to acttypes
in order to achieve generality Readers interested in the philosophical back
ground of these problems are recommended to read the writings of Castaneda
for example  where moral and legal norms are investigated
Instead of this approach most logicians conceive deontic logic as the logic of
normsentences or normpropositions such that oneas in the alethic casehas
sentenceforming deontic operators In this case the whole deductive apparatus
of alethic modal logics applies to the deontic case and a semantics can be given
But after this decision in favor of a formalization in the shadows of alethic
logics there still remain two approaches the monadic approach and the dyadic
one
The older monadic approach was soon troubled by paradoxes I present it
rst to show that for deontic logics a simple transfer from alethic ones is not
appropriate
According to deontic tradition there are three deontic operators namely
P O and F for permission obligation and prohibition For reasons that
will become clear later I follow this tradition and do not use the usual modal
operators   and  These operators can be interdened as follows
F  P
P  O 
With these operators one can build the deontic systems like the alethic ones
translating O for   etc and all further concepts for instance of a deon
tic alphabet of a deontic formula of normality regularity and congruence are
adapted from alethic logics But already this basic denition is disputed in the
literature  
 Some logicians believe that the necessitation rule which states
that all logical truths are obligatory is not acceptable von Wright for example
in his rst system 
 explicitly denies that tautologies are obligatory But
instead of discussing this matter let us consider the additional axioms of alethic
modal logics
  T or the equivalent abesseadposse principle   is not acceptable

for deontic logics Its translation would be   Pwhatever is actual
is permitted The opposite is the case whoever violates a duty realizes a
fact that is not permitted Therefore one must weaken the axiom to the
analog of the alethic axiom D in order to obtain O  P whatever
is obligatory is allowed Now one can understand the name of the axiom
D It plays exactly the role that T plays in alethic logics
  One could use a further axiom T
D
OO   instead of T which
can be deduced from T by simple application of the necessitation rule
With this axioms the formula OO   can be deduced if the system
contains K This formula is essential for the elimination of potences of
modal operators in stronger systems As noted above this does not work
only with axiom D T
D
states sloppily formulated that you are obliged
to realize obligations This seems reasonable
  The translation of the alethic formula EP  OPstates that what
ever is allowed ought to be allowed It is open to doubt that this principle
should be accepted but is is not counterintuitive
  The Brouwer formula B     is similar to the abesseadposse
principle considered above it is unacceptable under the deontic interpre
tation One should weaken it like T
These considerations are already su#cient to construct the standard monadic
deontic systems corresponding to the alethic systems K T S S but note
that the systems that presented here following  
 deviate from the systems
that Bull and Segerberg 
 or Chellas  call deontic In our systems
!
Aqvist calls them SmileyHanson systemsthe formula T
D
is assumed as a re
placement of the alethic formula T Addition of formula D then gives stronger
versions of the systems obtained so far Bull and Segerberg Chellas and oth
ers start with axiom D In Chellas calculus T
D
is added as a weakening of
E  in S it is redundant because it can be deduced from E K nec and
propositional logic
Summarizing here is a list of the formulas considered so far
K O  O O
D O P
T
D
OO 
 O OO
E PO O
B
D
OPO  
These formulas dene the SmileyHanson systems in Lemmon code Again as
in the alethic case we want the systems given below to be the smallest normal
systems of modal logic containing the formulas on the right side of the equations
as axioms
OK  K


OT  KT
D

OS  KT
D

OB  KT
D
B
D

OS  KE
and further
OK

 OK  fDg
OT

 OT  fDg
OS

 OS  fDg
OB

 OB  fDg
OS

 OS  fDg 
Deontic logics according to Bull and Segerberg and Chellas are constructed
similar to the systems given by
!
Aqvist by replacing T with D
The semantics also carries over from alethic logic the accessibility relation
of the alethic systems is now called the relation of deontic alternative or co
permissibility Now what is the idea behind deontic possible worlds According
to relational semantics a formula O holds in a possible world i  holds in
all its deontic alternatives So the deontic alternative relation gives a notion
of deontic perfectionin deontic alternatives all obligations are actual This
really captures Leibniz idea of the best of all possible worlds and the name
idealization for the frame constraint of D is evident too For every possible
world there is a better one T would impose reexivity but this clearly would
destroy seriality between the possible worlds Transitivity seems to be a natural
requirement for the series of possible worlds too This calls for  The Brouwer
formula imposing symmetry like T would destroy the ordering of possible
worlds Its weaker form B
D
only imposes symmetry on deontic alternatives
E has the frame constraint of euclidityalternatives of a possible world are
alternatives of each other Adding this axiom to S leads to S such that
the frame constraint is an equivalence relation This seems to be too strong for
deontic logics Now take a closer look at the frame constraint of T
D
 it imposes
the condition that deontic alternatives of a possible world are reexive
Suppose that T
D
holds and that in our world an obligation is violatedlet
O and  be true Then our world must be a worst of all possible worlds 
our world cannot be better than any other world because in all deontic alterna
tives of some world T
D
must hold and therefore no obligation can be violated
This requirement is indeed very strictmaybe too strict Consider the directed
graph corresponding to the frame constraint of T
D
 It has two vertices a line
between the two and a loop at the second vertex A weaker graph would be to
open this loop ie to modify it to a graph with three vertices and two lines
not between the same vertices One possible frame constraint would be density
which corresponds to the formula OO  On the other hand this formula
is an easy consequence of T
D
with the help of K and modus ponens In general
it might be worth while investigating the correspondences between the Gestalt
change of the directed graphs and applications of rules and axioms Chellas 
 
believes that S supplemented with the last formula might be appropriate for
applications Of course it would again be possible to turn from normal to reg
ular or even to congruent systems but this is obviously not very popular and I
do not want to go further into details
Kanger   
 gives an interesting translation from deontic to alethic modal
logics employing a new constant Q for an ideal commitment He denes
O   Q 
P  Q
 
F   Q  
Then by addition of the axiom
Q Q
to the systems of alethic modal logics containing Q as a new member of the
language one obtains following the terminology of  
 the systems K

Q
 T

Q

S

Q
S

Q
etc For these systems the alethic frames hW Ri must be extended
to triplesaugmented frameshW ROi where O  W is the set of best or
optimal worlds Now we have the semantic requirement
M w j Q w  O 
The frame constraint on Q is
w


w
 
Rw


w
 

 w
 
 O
in addition to the usual alethic semantics All of these alethic systems can
be proved sound and complete  
 One can further show   that there
is a translation from these alethic systems to the deontic systems with the
corresponding name
In the dyadic approach monadic operators O and P are now replaced by
the dyadic operators O

and P

 that formalize relative modalities with the
monadic operators as special cases
O  O
 

P  P
 

F  P
 
 
Introducing a new predicatein the monadic case it was a constantalethic
denitions of the deontic operators can be obtained
Q  Q
O

   Q 
P

  Q
 
F

   Q  

Dyadic axioms correspond to the monadic ones with slight modications
K

O

   O

  O


D

O

  P


T

D
O

O

  


O

 O

O


E

P

O

 O

 
These axioms lead to the deontic systems O

K O

T O

S O

S etc The
alethic systems K

Q
 T

Q
 S

Q
 S

Q
etc are the usual alethic systems with
augmented vocabulary as in the monadic case
Again we have two dierent frames the deontic ones and the augmented
alethic ones In the deontic case the frames are similar to those of the usual
alethic systems except for the relation of deontic alternativeness R

O
which
now is dened as a function from the set of sentences into the set of binary
relations on the set of possible worlds The truth conditions for the deontic
operator O

have to be relativized to the condition
M w


j O

  fa w
 
 WR

w


w
 
M w
 
j 
and a similar condition holds for P


The set constraints have to be relativized too For example the set con
straint for the axiom 

is
  w


 w
 
 w

R

w


w
 

 R

w
 
w

 R

w


w

 
The augmented alethic models are again triples hW ROi The alethic
accessibility relation can be taken over from the monadic case but now O
is not a set anymore but a function from the set of sentences of the alethic
language enriched by the predicate Q into the powerset of possible worlds
So O is relativized to the conditions But then the truth condition for Q must
also be modied
M w j Q w  O 
Soundness and completeness proofs for these systems as well as a translation
theorem corresponding to that of the monadic case can be obtained    To
day there are some considerable attempts to use dyadic systems that go much
further than the systems given in this text consider for example  

But now let us come back to informal questions Why are there dierent
attempts to formalize deontic concepts Here is a brief consideration of the
monadic systems a detailed discussion may be found in  

Basically the discussion of and the search for deontic systems was always
guided by paradoxes the most famous ones are  
 
  Rosss Paradox
  Priors Paradox of derived obligation
  Chisholms contrarytoduty imperative paradox

  the dilemma of commitment and detachment
  prima facie versus actual obligation the ceteris paribus proviso
  the oughtimpliescan problem
  CastanVedas Good Samaritan paradox and the Jephta dilemma
  the problem of actutilitarism in relation to deontic logic
For a discussion of these paradoxa and problems consider the references given
above We restrict ourselves to a brief sketch
Rosss paradox rests on fact that one can prove the formulas
O O   P P   
in normal monadic systems      is a tautology and then the result
is easily obtained with nec K and modus ponens Now consider the natural
language sentences
i You post the letter ii You burn the letter
The translation of the oughtformula is If I ought to post the letter I ought to
post or to burn it This looks paradoxical because I can realize this obligation
by burning the letter'
For the second formula consider the sentences
i You smoke ii You kill somebody
In this case the translation is If I am allowed to smoke then I am allowed
to smoke or to kill somebody These paradoxes are much under discussion
among philosophers Some think that there is no paradox but only confusion
of material implication but the majority nds it is worthwhile debating Von
Wright 
 gives a detailed analysis of the paradox concluding that it rests on
subtle philosophical questions like free choice Without going into details we
refer the reader to 
  
 and the references given there and in 
Priors paradox rests on the fact that sentences of either the form
  O O   O
O O  O  O 
can be derived in all of the SmileyHanson systems of monadic deontic logic
although they do not appear validthe reader may check this by inserting
appropriate sentences According to
!
Aqvist there are two ways of treating these
paradoxical sentences namely to formulate them away and to reconsider the
applicability of monadic deontic logic to natural language discourse
The rst approach shows that simple manipulations reduce the formulas
of the rst line to harmless propositional tautologies and those of the second
line to Rosss formulas The second approach takes the problem seriously and
claims that monadic deontic logic is not able to formalise natural language in a

satisfying way For instance if we attempt to read the formula O  as 
commits us to do  then we must face the fact that a forbidden act commits
us anything So von Wright 
 introduces dyadic operators similar to those
introduced above and opened the way to a new line of research In the dyadic
systems given above the formulas corresponding to those of Priors paradox
are in fact no longer derivable The introduction of dyadic deontic operators
therefore seems to be a more promising approach to concepts of commitment
obligation and permission and one may draw the general conclusion that deontic
logic cannot be simply alethic modal logic with reformulated axioms
The Chisholm contrarytoduty imperative paradox is the following set of
sentences
i It ought to be that a certain man go to the assistance of his
neighbors
ii It ought to be that if he go he tell them he is coming
iii If he does not go he ought not tell them he is coming
iv He does not go
It is commonly accepted on an intuitive basis that the above sentences are
nonredundant and consistent but monadic logics seem unable to formalize the
sentences in a way that pays tribute to our intuitions So again the right
line of attack seems to be the use of dyadic deontic logic and it can indeed be
shown  
  
 that dyadic logics can handle the problem in a satisfactory
way
In brief Rosss Priors and Chisholms paradox can be overcome by the use
of dyadic deontic logics butas a careful reader will have noticedthere are
still ve problems open These problems are more di#cult to state so that we
cannot go into the details and refer the reader to   

The dilemma of commitment and detachment arises from the fact that one
wants to be able to derive unconditional from conditional obligations under
certain circumstances But a straightforward solution leads again to a violation
of Chisholms paradox This is the dilemma but there are also attempts of
solutions to it  

The prima facie vs actual obligation is the problem that obligations can
be overruled by a change of situation
The Good Samaritan paradox  is the following argument
i If Bob pays (

 to the man he will murder one week hence
then Bob will murder a man one week hence
ii It ought to be that Bob pays (

 to the man he will murder one
week hence
iii It ought to be that Bob will murder a man next week
The argument deducing iii from i and ii is obviously not sound but nev
ertheless it can be obtained in all monadic systems given above
The other problems are not so easy to introduce but the general claim
is  that all the systems considered so far are not su#cient Van Eck

therefore introduces a combination of time and deontic operators together with
quanticationanother example of a multimodal approach is given in 
which helps him to face all the problems stated above This makes van Ecks
approach very promising and we highly recommend it to further investigation
Another system with quantiers is that of Castaneda  which up to now has
perhaps not received the attention it deserves From a philosophical point of
view Castaneda was probably for the seventies and eighties what von Wright
was for the decades beforethe philosopher who made the deepest investigation
in the formal structure of morality and ethics
 Quanticational Modal Logics
 General Remarks
It is a pedagogic tradition in nonmodal logics to introduce the propositional
calculus rst and reserve quanticational theory for a later chapter The rea
son for this is merely to teach the reader some fundamental methods in an
easy setting Although there are some dierences between propositional and
quanticational rst order logicfor example decidability and the proof proce
dures depending on thatthere is no real methodic dierence concerning the
metatheorems In modal logic the situation is completely dierent So the
reason that I have not treated quanticational modal logic up to now is not
a pedagogic one but has to do with the problems connected with the incor
poration of quantiers The problems are not syntactical onesa syntactical
treatment of quantiers in modal logics is straight forwardit is the semantics
both formal and informal which make the enterprise di#cult A consideration
of the epistemic systems popular among the AI community     reveals
the almost total lack of quanticational systemsthe same holds for deontic
logics But I think nevertheless that one should try to face the problems con
nected with quantication Maybe the restriction to propositional calculi can
help to solve some interesting small engineering problems but everyone who
subscribes to cognitive adequate systems must face the fact that contemporary
epistemic AI systems under a wider perspective are far from satisfactory and
that in general any serious logical theory must be able to handle quantication
Therefore we give a perspective on quantied alethic modal logics following Fit
ting  and Kreiser et al  
 for the formal Garson   Loux  
 and
Kripke   for the philosophical aspects Lenzen   who gives a sketch of
a quanticational modal logic of knowledge and belief may serve as a reference
for the more specic epistemical problems van Eck  for the deontic ones
In general there seem to be few serious attempts for quanticational epistemic
deontic logics but we hope that with the new strong interest in these domains
this situation may change
The novice may wonder why quantied modal logic is considered dicult
This rhetorical remark stands at the beginning of Garsons chapter on quan
tication in modal logic in the Handbook of Philosophical Logic   But one
page later the reader is confronted with a huge Quantied Modal Logic Road
map reecting the spectrum of approaches to modal quantication and an

orientation in the philosophical literature leaves one with the impression that
there are at least as many approaches to the eld as there are philosophers or
logicians working in it
The syntactic specications are nevertheless straight forward simply build
the modal operators into the set of formulas Again as in the case of proposi
tional logic the language L
QM
of quanticational modal logic is a language L of
rst order logic provided with the additional symbol   L
M
 Lf g and all
further syntactic concepts for formation of terms and formulas can be imported
from the nonmodal case except the fact that there is a formulaformation
rule for the modal operator The calculus is specied exactly as in nonmodal
rst order logic by adding the axioms of propositional modal calculus to these
nonmodal rst order axioms and supplying the system with any of the modal
rules necessitation monotonicity or congruence one obtains a hierarchy of
systems similar to the propositional case with the only dierence that they
now may include equality
The primary semantics for these systems is still straightforward Instead of
mapping formulas to truth values relative to possible worlds one now attaches
rst order quantication domains or universes to any of the possible worlds So
a rst order frame is a triple hW RDi where W is a nonempty set of possible
worldsR is a binary relation onW  the accessibility relation and D is a mapping
from elements w of W to nonempty domains Dw for the possible world w
This image is even more intuitive than its propositional counterpart The worlds
are not mere points anymore but carriers of objects functions and relations as
in a nonmodal universe but in general one must impose restrictions on the
universes For example if you live in a world in which certain facts hold then
the substrate that generates these facts should exist in the accessible worlds
too That makes life much easier One possibility is to simply x the domains
Another is to require monotonicity ie that no world accessible from another
world be smaller than the former
  The Maze of Metaphysics
Before entering details let us consider a general problem connected with quan
tication in general with some impact on modal logics There are basically two
dierent theories of quantication namely objectual quantication and substi
tutional quantication
A mathematically educated logician might make a career without realizing
this dierentiation but philosophers might fail their BA when not aware of
it The objectual interpretation is perhaps best highlighted by Quines famous
slogans to be is to be the value of a variable and no entity without identity
because quantication under this interpretation introduces ontological commit
ments and standards of ontological admissibility According to the theory of
eliminability of proper names it is the bound variables and not the names that
carry ontological information
Under the objectual interpretation a formula of the form x is true i for
all objects in the domain  holds a formula of the form x is true i for at
least one object in the domain  holds
	
Under the substitutional interpretation a formula of the form x is true
i all substitution instances for x in  are true a formula of the form x is
true i at least one of the substitution instances for x in  is true
The objectual interpretation is the standard approach Now what is the
impact of the two theories on quantied modal logic Let me give a rough
description Quine gives the following argument
     	
   the number of planets
 x x  	 by existential generalization
Another chain of inference would be
 

   	


 xx  	 by existential generalization


  xx  	 by necessitation
The rst derivation leeds to a de re the second to a de dicto formula The rst
derivation is ne Indeed there is necessarily an object greater than seven
namely the object denoted by the denite description the number of planets
But on the other hand is it necessary that there is an object greater than seven
If you think that it is the number nine then you are wrong argues Quine be
cause nine is the number of planets and this number is only contingently greater
than seven What happens basically is the quantication into an intensional
context This problem of quantifying in is the main problem connected with
quanticational intensional logics and most of the di#culties with those logics
are consequences of it We will return to this problem later Quine sees only
one way out of this dilemmathe assumption of essentialism the thesis that
objects have some of their properties necessarily and others contingently So
the number of planets is only contingently nine but nine is necessarily seven
plus two The underlying problem is a clash between the quantication in inten
sional contexts and the congruence property of equalitythe Leibniz principle
of substitutability of equals Quines argument is that modal logic is not the
appropriate mechanism to account for this kind of quantication and so the
modal logics discussed in this text are inconvenient for a formalization of in
tensionality There are many replies to Quine some defending de re modalities
and essentialism others trying to detect failures in Quines argument For a
detailed discussion consider  One objection to Quine is that his argument
rests on the assumption of objectual quantication If one assumes substitu
tional quantication then these problems including the commitment to de re
modalities disappear 
Most of the quanticational modal approaches oered by the dierent au
thors react to and try to handle the problem proposed by Quine and another
problem that comes with identity namely the fact that all identities are nec
essary which can be derived from the obvious logical truth  x  x My
general impression is that none of the existing approaches is able to handle the
problems in a completely satisfying way So we will not investigate the best of
all possible theories but briey sketch a variety of these

The various approaches to quanticational modal logic can be classied
according to several aspects their informal account of possible worlds their
handling of the transworld identity problem and their formal semantic struc
ture
The rst and the last aspect do not need any further discussion The
transworld identity problem is the problem of giving adequate criteria for trac
ing an object through possible worlds Compared to the two other aspects
given it may seem as a somewhat limited and special problem but this is not
true the problem of transworld identity isaccording to literaturethe cen
tral problem of quantied modal logic The three aspects with regard to modal
logics are of course not independent of another It is clear that formal semanti
cal constraints have an impact on the philosophical positionsfor example via
ontological commitments but in general it is the philosophical position which
should be seen as the foundation for the formal
Now there is a large amount of philosophical or semiformal attitudes to
wards modal quantication the conceptualism approach Kripke and the re
alism approach with a bifurcation in the possibilism Lewis and the actualism
approach Platinga Stalnaker Discussion of these positions follows below
Transworld identity led to the following principal positions the trivial
identity theory Lewiss the counterpart theory Kripkes theory of rigid desig
nators the predicate abstraction theory by StalnakerThomason Konolige and
Fitting and Platingas trivial solution These positions will be discussed in the
sequel too
Let me now expose the formal details of the various systems Garson  
gives a long list of dierent approaches to modal quantication We follow his
terminology
  objectual domain
   rigid designators
    xed domain
   worldrelative domains
    free logic
   classical logic and term elimination
   classical logic truth value gaps and nested domains
   classical logic truth value gaps and no domain restrictions
  nonrigid designators
   local terms
  global terms
 conceptual domain
  xed domain
 worldrelative domain
 substantial domain

  standard predicates
 intensional predicates
Let us briey describe the most important concepts of this list further dis
cussion may be found in   One of the concepts at the highest level in our
scheme is the concept of objectual domain This concept denotes the stan
dard approach where only objects are admitted to the domains at the possible
worlds Unlike the two other approaches at the same level this one needs no
further motivation If the decision for an objectual domain approach is made
one has another alternative that between rigid terms and nonrigid terms
 Rigid Designators
The idea of rigid designators is due to Kripke and stems from his metaphysical
convictions     From a semantical point of view it is very easy to
characterise this position It is simply required that proper names are rigid
denotators i they denote the same object in every possible world According to
our denition of intensions that means that the intension of a rigid designator
is a constant function Kripke in order to cope with these problems assumed
that proper names denote directly so that they have only ex but no intensions
If we subscribe to Kripkes deviation from Frege sematics it is straight forward
to dene rigid interpretations and consequently rigid models  where the
denotations of all constant symbolsall proper namesare determined by their
valuation
For Kripke the problem of transworld identity does not existobjects in
dierent possible worlds are identical by stipulation This must be seen in the
general framework of conceptualism Possible worldsaccording to Kripkeare
not entities existing in reality but cognitive alternatives to the one real world
ideas of how the world could be This again is reminiscent to Wittgensteins
logical space where the general structure is prescribed by logic all the laws of
nature causality etc are in their structure reducible to logic and a substance
that when lled into the logical frame determines the real world So on
Kripkes conceptualist account the general structure of the world is given and
the possible worlds are constructed by the human mind by lling in dierent
congurations of substance With this rigid ontology of course everything
equal is necessarily equal and Quines argument concerning the number nine and
the number of planets is trivialKripke does not try to avoid de re modalities
he shoes how to handle them The number of planets on Kripkes account is
a nonrigid designator for the number nine holding in some worlds and in some
others notby denition Another paradigm for Kripkes account for possible
worlds would again be the mathematical model of a sample space
The constraint of domain xing reduces the llin of substance to a pure
combinatorics It can be seen as the frame constraint of the Barcan formula
x    x which can be deduced in quanticational B but not in the
weaker systems It is obvious that symmetrythe frame constraint of the
formula Bimposes the ontological commitment of xed domains In a xed
domain universe even the formula x yx  y is validon the objectual


interpretation of quantication everything exists necessarily but it is question
able whether one should subscribe to this and not assume dierent objects in
dierent possible worlds
In all logics with nonxed domains if one has the necessitation rule one can
deduce the converse of the Barcan formula namely the formula  x x 
But this imposes the frame constraint of monotonicity or nested domainsa
domain of a possible world must be contained in all possible worlds accessible
from it Another problem of the approaches given so far is the treatment of
nonexisting objects like Pegasus or God This calls for free logic or at least
truth value gaps  
 NonRigid Designators
Some philosophers nd rigid terms problematic for several reasons
Kripkes theory of proper names deviates from the standard FregeRussell
theory of proper names as denite descriptions For Kripke proper names are
rigid designators and denite descriptions are not
 

With dynamic logic as a paradigm Pascal allows rigid program constants
only but not nonrigid program variables whereas LISP needs nonrigid func
tion symbols as programs can redene functions 
Nonrigid designators are necessary for Skolemization If we Skolemize a
formula  xx we are not allowed to take one single Skolemconstant say c
and insert it for x because in dierent possible worlds there might be dierent
objects satisfying  So if we want to introduce a convenient Skolemconstant
it must be nonrigid
Among the philosophers devising nonrigid approaches Lewis and Platinga
who can both be counted among the realists ie both of them believe that
possible worlds exist independent of our perception are most inuential
Lewis tries to depict a way mediating between transworld identity and
essentialism %a la Kripke He proposes a counterpart theory according to which
individuals are worldbound exist in only one world but may have counterparts
in other worlds Counterparts are only similar to but not identical with each
others Counterpart theory has some advantages over the rigid terms approach
but nevertheless it was also severely critisised by several authors      
  As Kripke points out it cannot handle the Leibniz Principle of the
identity of indiscernibles in a correct way Another argument goes as follows
Submit an object to slight changes in its properties when passing from one
world to another In this series every property list may be similar to that
of its neighbors but after a su#cient number of steps no one would ascribe
similarity to the rst and the last list of these series   Further discussion of
this position is included in the texts mentioned above and   Another facet
of Lewiss theory is the way he handles nonexisting object He is a possibilist
assuming a subdomain of nonexistent possibilia so that under the objectual
interpretation there exist things which do not exist This formula must not
be formalized as xyx  ywhich is absurd Lewis introduces additional
 
Nevertheless Kripke clearly oers a consistent alternative to the FregeRussell doctrine
 
quantiers restricted to existing things this is equivalent to the introduction
of sorts of course   Another way to handle this kind of problems is the
introduction of free logics
Plantinga on the other hand is an actualist rejecting quantication over
nonexistent objects Instead he uses the old platonic idea of dierentiation
between existence and instantiation to distinguish the actual world from the
possible others   For Plantinga a possible world is a possible state of
aairs but not just any possible state of aairs is a possible world Only
complete or maximal states of aairs are this concept being similar to maximal
consistency in logics Possible worlds are constructed like maximal consistent
sets or Hintikka sets in logics Identity must not be traced through possible
worlds it exists per constructionem and is completely trivial On the other
hand Platingas approach lacks the intuitivity of Lewiss or Kripkes account
There are still some severe problems with nonrigid designators namely the
problem of syntax ambiguity the problem of de re and de dicto modalities and
the problem of quantifying in again
In fact these problems are one single problem namely the problem of quan
tifying in de dicto contextsa scope problem
Fitting   develops a formalism for nonrigid designators in quantied
modal logics including a new symbol the predicate abstraction  He denes
x xc  xx 
 x  c
From the right side of the denition it is straight forward to derive the semantics
of the predicate abstraction operator
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Now Fitting denes de re and de dicto formulas as having the following form
x  c de re
 x c de dicto 
The reason for Fittings introduction of predicate abstractors are the scope prob
lems connected with nonrigid designators Consider for instance the formula
c where c is a nonrigid designator On a de re reading it would mean
that one picks out the denotation of c at our possible world and looks for an
accessible possible world where this same object has the property that in this
world corresponds to  On a de dicto reading we look for a world accessible
from our world such that the object denoted by c in the accessible world has the
property that in this world corresponds to  Of course with rigid designators

the de re and de dicto case coincide because c denotes the same object in all
possible worlds
To give an example let w


 denote our actual world let in our world c
denote Napoleon and   the concept won the battle of Waterloo So c is
false in w


 On a de re reading c is interpreted as Napoleon from our
world won the battle of Waterloo in some accessible possible world and on a
de dicto reading Some Napoleon who or whatever this may represent from
some accessible possible world won the battle of Waterloo in that world Now
assume the accessibility relation to be irreexive and further that in all possible
worlds dierent from our world Napoleon denotes a certain brand of wine Let
in some possible world our Napoleon win the battle of Waterloo under the name
of Wellington Then the de re reading becomes true and the de dicto reading
false In a rigid designator model our Napoleon is the same in all possible
worlds such that the de re reading turns out true if and only if the de dicto
reading does
But is this reallyas Fitting believesa matter of ambiguous syntax At
least a semantical analysis of the formula c leads directly to the de dicto
interpretation and it seems as if the ambiguity was merely due to insu#cient
care of translation between natural and formal language The de re and de
dicto readings should be explicitly formalized as
x  xc  x x 
 x  c de re
 x xc   xx 
 x  c or  c de dicto 
Up to now there is no ambiguity But in fact there is a problem with quan
tication namely the problem of quantifying in modal contexts According
to the usual quanticational axioms it is allowed to infer xx from c by
modus ponens This clearly leads to the paradox with the number nine and the
number of planets because this can be done for all formulas but in order to
avoid the paradox one simply has to restrict this quantication rule by taking
care of the modal operators quantifying in modal contexts has to be forbid
den Fitting  gives a similar argument involving the morning star evening
star paradox This example is a bit obscure in the context of equality as Fit
ting exposes it it is really again the quantifyingin problem Unfortunately
his argument is even further obscured by the fact that he talks about identity
of objects and writes  equality in fact Fitting means identity should be
thought of  as a relation on objects
 not on names for them How can two
sic' objects be identical' Frege and Wittgenstein would spin in their graves
Fittings argument is interesting for another reason In modal calculus with
equality one can deduce the formula
a  b  a  b 
Now on our reading this is the de dicto formula
a  b  x yx  y 
 x  a 
 y  b 
On a nonrigid interpretation one would reject this formula because it simply
is not valid It is not the case that the object denoted by a is identical with the

object denoted with b in all possible worlds Instead of this one would accept
the de dicto formula
a  b x y x  y 
 x  a 
 y  b
the interpretation of which is trivial Now one has to look for axioms which
take these facts into account 
 Further AlternativesThe Call for Free Logics
Garson   shows that the realism approach together with free logic instead
of classical logic in order to handle nonexisting objects makes a change of the
premodal axioms or rules necessary but this increases the di#culty of com
pleteness proofs For some variants completeness proofs even do not seem to
exist This all makes the nonrigid approach not especially satisfying   In
the conceptual interpretation one tries to avoid these inconveniences by quan
tifying also over individual concepts This modication introduces an essential
weakness to the system no consistent	 system is complete for this the usual
semantics   The problem is of course that here one enters the domain of
second order logic where completeness can only be obtained with respect to
general Henkin	 models Finally there is the substantial interpretation which
restricts the domain of quantication to the term intensions that reect the
way things are across possible worlds   For a discussion see the same ref
erence The important thing about the substantial interpretation is the fact
that a set of substances must be specied for every possible world within the
frame The most general modal logics with a substantial semantics even cannot
be axiomatized    But their rstorder fragments according to Garson
show a way of how to proceed in the future
A general formal problem with quanticational modal logics is to prove
completeness For some of the systems completeness proofs do not exist and in
general there is no canonical way of doing it This problem is also discussed at
length in Garson   For a general introduction to the philosophical problems
connected with modal logics read also Cocchiarellas Handbook article 
Epistemic interpretations introduce some new variants of our problems to
quanticational theory   but in general there is a straight transfer from
the alethic problems Lenzen in order to avoid some of them considers only
rigid models with the philosophical theory of Kripke in the background But
this is still di#cult enoughLenzen is not in a position to give completeness
proofs for all of his systems especially not for the mixedmodality systems he
proposes
As already stated there are quanticational systems for deontic modal log
ics   but I will leave the discovery and investigation of those systems
to the reader The system of van Eck requires temporal logics which lies be
yond the scope of the present paper and Castanedas system can I think be
appreciated only by those familiar with his general philosophical ideas

 Conclusion
In this paper I tried to sketch some philosophical logics to provide a philo
sophical background for some current AI research as a search through philo
sophical and computer science literature revealed that computer scientists are
often not aware of the philosophical problems connected with the logics they
consider Unless general philosophy of science where philosophy rst of all
deals with foundational or general methodical questions with almost no impact
to the scientists every days work in the case of philosophical logics philo
sophical problems are not marginal but the reason for the many insu#ciencies
with alethic epistemic and deontic logics The principal problem behind that
is the fact that no one really knows how to handle intensionality in general
One can easily verify this argument by considering AI systems of belief Usu
ally propositional S or S is used but one hardly nds a discussion of this
choice going beyond statements of the form S means positive introspection
S negative introspection Instead knowledge and belief are di#cult strati
ed concepts and really worth a thorough investigation On the other hand
the philosophical enterprise towards general intensional logics connected with
names like Anderson Church Montague Gallin Kaplan and Castaneda in
order to mention only a few is far from complete
If one divides research on modal logics into three main objectives namely re
search into formal mathematical properties into structural philosophical prop
erties and into the construction of cognitive adequate models of epistemic or
deontic agents only the rst group of scientists might neglect philosophical
problems AI researchers should not Cognitive adequacy requires acquain
tance with cognitive theories with psychology linguistics and philosophy but
the proper problems connected with modal expressions are genuinely philosoph
ical
My sketch of the relevant features of philosophy of mind and language was
neither intended to be deep nor exhausting it should simply make computer
scientists sensitive and allow for an orientation in the philosophical literature
Therefore I gave some introductory remarks on Frege semantics and some re
sulting features of intensionality Then the connection to modal metaphysics
and modal logics was pointed out and a discussion of the various alethic modal
systems was given It was shown to what extent a simple parallelism between
alethic epistemic and deontic logics raises problems and what methods are em
ployed to solve them Epistemic modalities strictly behave nonintensionally
and therefore some debatable assumptions must be introduced to assimilate
epistemic logics to the alethic ones Deontic logics are even more debated
Many philosophers doubt whether they should be given a semantics at all To
all these points detailed references are given such that the reader should in
principle be able to undertake a closer examination
One major problem with modal logics is the underlying di#culty of quanti
cation into intensional contexts I presented a method proposed by Fitting for
xing the scope of variables and explicitly depicting de re and de dicto formulas
which attempts to be able to handle this problem Another central problem of
quanticational modal logics the problem of transworld identity was discussed

Various ontological and semantical approaches to this problem including the
debate of rigid and nonrigid designators and Kripkes and Kaplans deviations
from Fregean semantics were sketched
Besides these considerations within possible worlds metaphysics and seman
tics I also mentioned possibleworldfree alternatives like algebraic semantics
and general approaches to intensionality like those of Church and Bealer Unfor
tunately I could not present convincing solutions for most of the problems under
consideration but only point out where future research might be important
for example in free logics
As a main conclusion I want to note that the eld under investigation is
in ux on both sides the philosophical and the articial intelligence one One
should appreciate the AI approaches from the phenomenological side because
they brought a new dynamics to the eld and one should never wait for general
solutions but nevertheless it is worth taking serious the philosophical questions
in favor of synergetic eects Philosophical logics are maybe the only domain
where contemporary philosophy has relevant ideas to contribute
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